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Homebuilders, affiliated financing arms, and the mortgage crisis 
Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Claudine Gartenberg, Anna Paulson, and Sriram Villupuram
Introduction and summary
Nearly a third of all families purchasing new homes in 
2006 obtained a mortgage from a financing company 
owned by or affiliated with a large homebuilder (see 
figure 1).1 Eighty percent of these loans were made by 
financing companies associated with one of the ten 
largest homebuilders in the country.2 In addition to 
accounting for a large share of new home sales and  
financing, homebuilders were particularly active in areas 
of the country where the subprime crisis was most acute 
(Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada). As well as 
being important simply because of the number of loans 
that they underwrite, homebuilder financing arms are 
interesting because their incentives differ from those 
of unaffiliated lenders.3 Press accounts of homebuilder 
lending practices have focused on their incentive to 
sell homes and their purported willingness to extend 
unconventional mortgage products to borrowers with 
less-than-stellar credit histories.4 These factors have 
led to accusations that homebuilders contributed to 
the formation of the housing bubble and the ensuing 
foreclosure crisis. However, despite playing a poten-
tially important role in explaining house price trends 
and mortgage defaults, homebuilder mortgage lend-
ing has received little research attention to date.5
At first glance, the allegations of the nefarious role 
played by the homebuilders in the crisis are consistent 
with academic research on the behavior of lenders af-
filiated with a company that produced the good that is 
being financed. From an intuitive viewpoint, homebuilder 
financing arms may behave differently because their 
corporate parent profits from both the sale of the house 
and its financing and continues to lose money the longer 
the home stays in inventory. Consequently, such lenders 
have a strong motivation to find financing terms that 
will lead to a sale. This incentive may in turn lead to 
less screening of borrowers and to mortgage terms that 
get the deal done but may not be sustainable for the 
borrower. As the pace of home purchases slowed in 
2006–07 and homebuilders were faced with growing 
inventories of unsold homes, these incentives may have 
become even stronger. 
This intuition has been evaluated empirically in 
other (non-housing) markets by a number of studies that 
looked at credit decisions and subsequent performance 
of loans made by the affiliated lenders. In particular, 
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studies that compare bank lending with that of captive 
finance companies (Carey, Post, and Sharpe, 1998) and 
of auto lending (Barron, Chong, and Staten, 2008) sug-
gest that affiliated finance companies have a greater 
incentive to focus on moving inventory into the “sold” 
column. Both of these papers find evidence that finance 
companies serve observably riskier borrowers and, in 
the case of auto loans, that loans by affiliated lenders 
experience higher default rates. A related literature 
focuses on the more general case in which some lenders 
possess superior information about the borrower, which 
is arguably true in the case of affiliated lenders. For 
instance, Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010) evaluate the effects of proximity 
between lenders and borrowers on credit allocation 
decisions, with the premise that shorter distances proxy 
for better information. These papers find that more-
distant borrowers pay higher interest rates, which is 
consistent with the idea of asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders. In this article, we use 
loan-level data from 2001 to 2008 to investigate the 
characteristics and default outcomes of home purchase 
mortgages underwritten by homebuilders, compared 
with those of mortgages issued by unaffiliated financial 
institutions. Our findings indicate that homebuilder  
financing affiliates do make loans to observably riskier 
borrowers, as one might expect from the literature, and 
that a greater share of homebuilder loans have risky 
characteristics (for example, little documentation). 
Despite these limitations, loans made by homebuilders 
have lower 12- and 24-month delinquency rates over 
our full sample period than loans made by unaffiliated 
lenders, even when loan and borrower characteristics 
are held constant. While homebuilder loans outperform 
similar loans made by other lenders throughout the period 
that we examine, their relative default performance in 
the near term (12-month) is stronger even among loans 
originated during the boom-and-bust period that includes 
2005 through 2008. Even over a longer 24-month  
horizon, we find no evidence that homebuilder loans 
had higher default rates. These findings are surprising, 
given that industry lending standards were particularly 
lax in 2005 and 2006 and that homebuilders were 
burdened by large unsold home inventories in 2007 
and 2008. 
Our findings thus run counter to the existing work 
on affiliated lending in auto lending and captive finance 
companies. They also pose a challenge to explanations 
of the housing bubble and the foreclosure crisis that 
assign a central role to homebuilders and their lending 
FIGURE 1
Quarterly home purchases and mortgage originations, four-quarter moving average (000s)
Sources: HMDA (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) data, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,  
and the National Association of Realtors.
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affiliates. Indeed, since builder-affiliated lenders were 
able to lend to riskier borrowers and still deliver superior 
default performance, perhaps some aspects of their 
lending practices should be emulated as policymakers 
aim to mitigate defaults while maintaining access to 
credit for a wide cross section of home buyers. 
Although our study lacks the necessary data to 
determine specific reasons behind homebuilder ability 
to achieve lower default rates, we offer some potential 
explanations, most of which rely on the special nature 
of housing markets. They include: 1) a superior ability 
of homebuilder-affiliated lenders to procure information 
about borrowers and the quality of housing collateral; 
2) stronger incentives within affiliated lenders for risk 
management in loan underwriting that may stem both 
from their reliance on capital market funding and the 
multistage nature of homebuilding projects; 3) the 
auxiliary provision of financial education and coaching 
to borrowers; and 4) borrower self-selection associated 
with a sometimes lengthy period between down pay-
ment and taking possession of a finished home. 
The next section of the article provides a descrip-
tion of the data. This is followed by a univariate com-
parison of the borrower and loan characteristics, as well 
as the delinquency experience of homebuilder versus 
non-homebuilder loans over the 2001–08 period. Then 
we present the associated multivariate analysis, which 
incorporates macroeconomic factors as well as micro-
data on borrower and loan characteristics. We examine 
the potential role of changes in the underwriting process 
and homebuilder incentives during two distinct periods: 
2001–04 (the initial buildup in housing prices) and 
2005–08 (the period when housing prices peaked and 
then declined sharply). Next, we focus on the relative 
performance of homebuilder loans within specific 
mortgage contract categories. Finally, we discuss the 
results and steps for future work.
Data
We use two main sources of data for our study: 
loan-level data furnished by LPS Applied Analytics 
(LPS) and the public version of the database of home 
loan applications and originations collected under the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). LPS aggre-
gates data from mortgage-servicing companies that 
participate in the HOPE NOW Alliance.6 The most recent 
LPS data cover about 30 million mortgages through-
out the United States. Our sample covers mortgages 
originated between 2001 and 2008, which allows us 
to analyze the loans made during the housing bubble 
buildup years 2001–04, as well as the 2005–08 period, 
during which housing prices peaked and then collapsed. 
The data include prime and subprime mortgages, as 
well as loans that are securitized or held on bank balance 
sheets. In addition to monthly data on loan performance, 
LPS contains information on key borrower and loan 
characteristics at origination. Based on a comparison 
of the LPS and HMDA data, we estimate that the LPS 
data cover about 60 percent of the prime market each 
year from 2004 through 2007. Coverage of the sub-
prime market is somewhat smaller, but increases over 
time, going from just under 30 percent in 2004 to just 
under 50 percent in 2007. In addition to monthly data 
on loan performance status, LPS contains information 
on key borrower and loan characteristics at origination. 
This includes the borrower’s FICO credit score, the 
loan amount and interest rate, whether the loan is a 
fixed or a variable-rate mortgage, the ratio of loan 
amount to home value (LTV), and whether the loan 
was intended for home purchase or refinancing. Un-
fortunately, we do not observe whether borrowers took 
on additional mortgages in the form of piggyback loans 
that accompanied the first mortgage, or in the form of 
second-lien lines of credit or closed-end loans originated 
at some later point. The outcome variable that we focus 
on is whether the loan becomes 90 days or more past 
due in the 12 months following origination. We focus 
on loan performance during the first 12 and 24 months 
since mortgage origination rather than a longer period, 
so that loans made in 2008 can be analyzed in the same 
way as earlier loans, as our data are complete through 
the end of 2010.
Because homebuilders do not participate in refinanc-
ing markets, we limit our sample to mortgages used 
for home purchase. We further exclude purchases of 
non-single-family residences, as well as FHA (Federal 
Housing Administration) and VA (U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs) mortgages.7 The resulting sample con-
sists of about 86,000 mortgages originated by home-
builder-affiliated lenders and 5.2 million mortgages 
originated by unaffiliated financial institutions between 
2001 and 2008.  
Homebuilder loans, borrowers, and  
their mortgage performance
The first two columns of table 1 compare the geo-
graphic distribution of homebuilder lending activity 
and the attributes of homebuilder borrowers with those 
of other lenders over the entire sample period. It further 
contrasts loan characteristics and performance of 
homebuilder and non-homebuilder loans.
Homebuilder lending appears to have been more 
concentrated in areas that exhibited high house price 
growth during the formative years of the bubble and 
that experienced a collapse in prices in 2006–08. In 
particular, the four states most commonly associated 
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with the bubble—Arizona, California, Florida, and 
Nevada—account for about 32 percent of homebuilder 
lending, but only 21 percent of loans for home purchase 
by other lender types. Figure 2, which presents a county-
level distribution of the mortgage market share attrib-
uted to the affiliated homebuilder lenders, paints a 
similar picture. 
Over the entire sample, the average FICO score 
of homebuilder borrowers was lower than that of bor-
rowers with loans from non-builders. This difference 
is due to the higher share of subprime and near-sub-
prime households among those financed by the home-
builders. Among homebuilder borrowers, 21 percent 
had FICO scores below 660, compared with 15 percent 
for those who borrowed from other lenders. Loans 
originated by homebuilders were more likely to con-
tain prepayment penalties.
Relative to other borrowers, those obtaining credit 
from a builder had similar annual incomes but purchased 
a somewhat more expensive house. The resulting  
difference in median ratios of house value to household 
income (VTI) is both economically and statistically 
significant—for a given level of income, homebuilder 
borrowers purchased houses valued at about 2.5 percent 
more than non-homebuilder borrowers.
There is very little difference in average mortgage 
values or first-lien loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of home-
builder and non-homebuilder loans. Taken together with 
values for income and house values, this suggests that 
homebuilder borrowers took on larger mortgages with 
lower income bases. The weaker financial footing of 
homebuilder borrowers is also underscored by their 
greater reliance on mortgages underwritten on the basis 
of less-than-full documentation. At least 38 percent of 
homebuilder loans were based on the borrowers’ stated, 
as opposed to verified, income. Earlier work has shown 
that stated income loans, on average, overstated 
household earnings (Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, forth-
coming). In addition, homebuilder mortgages were more 
likely to have adjustable rates or be non-amortizing, 
   TABLE 1
Homebuilder loans, borrowers, and mortgage performance
The sample includes purchase, conventional, first-lien mortgages for single-family homes.
 Builder Other Builder Other
 affiliates lenders affiliates lenders
Year of origination       2001–08 2001–08 2001–04 2005–08 2001–04 2005–08
Number of loans 85,767 5,234,080 54,487 31,280 2,559,824 2,674,256
Bubble state loans (%) 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.20
      
Median FICO score 720 732 714 730 731 732
FICO below 620 (%) 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06
FICO below 660 (%) 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.16
      
Median household income ($) 76,000 78,000 71,000 88,000 74,000 83,000
Median home value ($) 233,000 225,000 200,000 295,495 204,000 248,000
Median value-to-income ratio 3.08 3.01 2.92 3.43 2.92 3.11
Median mortgage amount ($) 179,350 173,375 157,736 224,800 158,650 189,900
Median loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 79.59 79.79 79.78 79.20 79.89 79.70
      
Fixed-rate mortgages (%) 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.65 0.74 0.71
Adjustable-rate mortgages (%) 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.04
Hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (%) 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06
Non-amortizing mortgages (%) 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.25 0.10 0.19
Prepayment penalties (%) 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.08
Less-than-full documentation (%) 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.29
12-month securitization rate 96.0 90.2 95.7 96.3 90.3 90.2
      
12-month default rate 1.2 1.6 0.5 2.4 0.5 2.7
24-month default rate 3.9 4.4 1.0 9.0 1.5 7.2
      
12-month default rate (FICO < 660) 3.3 6.4 1.4 10.3 2.3 10.0
24-month default rate (FICO < 660) 8.1 15.0 2.7 27.4 6.0 23.1
12-month default rate (FICO ≥ 660) 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.3
24-month default rate (FICO ≥ 660) 2.8 2.5 0.4 6.6 0.7 4.2
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
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thereby reducing the initial monthly mortgage service 
flows relative to more traditional fixed-rate loans. 
At first glance, this summary is consistent with the 
common perception that homebuilders offered loans in 
bubble areas, were willing to lend to less creditworthy 
buyers who were buying more expensive homes rela-
tive to their (stated) incomes, and used loan contracts 
with riskier features, such as prepayment penalties, 
adjustable interest rates, and non-amortizing schedules. 
However, as evidenced by the comparison of  
columns 1 and 2 in table 1, homebuilder lending resulted 
in lower defaults than other types of lending. During the 
first 12 months following loan origination, borrowers 
with loans from homebuilders defaulted at a 1.2 percent 
rate, compared with a 1.6 percent rate among borrowers 
with non-homebuilder loans.8 This difference in loan 
performance was particularly pronounced among the 
subset of borrowers with the lowest credit scores (FICO 
scores below 660), for which homebuilder loans display 
markedly lower default rates. Among such borrowers, 
the average 12-month default rate on homebuilder loans 
originated during 2001–08 is 3.3 percent; the correspond-
ing figure for non-homebuilder loans is 6.4 percent. 
This difference persists over a 24-month horizon when 
default rates for homebuilder loans rise to 8.1 percent 
and for non-homebuilder loans to 15.0 percent. Among 
more-creditworthy borrowers (FICO scores above 660), 
homebuilder loans outperform the non-homebuilder 
loans over the 12-month horizon, but exhibit somewhat 
higher default rates over the 24-month horizon.
Figure 3 provides some insight into temporal proper-
ties of defaults on loans originated by the two types of 
lenders. For a given vintage of loans (those originated 
in calendar year 2005), figure 3 plots the monthly  
series of the fraction of loans that become 90 days  
or more past due. The early relative performance of 
label
FIGURE 2
County-level home builder loan share, 2005 originations homebuilder
Sources: HMDA (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) data and LPS Applied Analytics.
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loans originated by homebuilder lenders is particularly 
striking, as there are very few defaults in the first nine 
months following origination. Although the monthly 
default rates of the two lender types converge somewhat 
over time, the less creditworthy borrowers served by 
the homebuilders fare better throughout most of the 
24-month horizon. 
Figure 4 offers a spatial perspective on defaults 
during the first 12 months for loans originated in 2005. 
A quick visual inspection suggests that the areas of 
the country that experienced the highest mortgage  
default rates in 2006 were not the same ones that had 
the largest fractions of home purchases financed by 
homebuilder lending affiliates.9
Note that the above analysis focuses on the uncon-
ditional default rate and does not take into account the 
geographic concentration of homebuilder loans in the 
bubble states or the greater share of loan features (for 
example, adjustable rates or less-than-full documen-
tation), all of which would tend to make homebuilder 
default rates higher. Put differently, homebuilders 
make riskier loans, on average, and these loans have 
lower defaults than safer loans made by other lenders. 
Controlling for characteristics of loans,  
borrowers, and geography
The univariate comparisons in the preceding  
section do not take into account the differences in 
homebuilder and non-homebuilder loans summarized 
in table 1 or differences in trends in the relative activity 
of homebuilders versus other lenders over time. To 
account for these differences, we estimate a logit model 
of mortgage default that conditions on location-specific 
macroeconomic factors, as well as the borrower and 
loan characteristics described in table 1.10 In addition 
to a set of state dummies and origination year fixed 
effects, these specifications also include the change in 
the MSA (metropolitan statistical area) level home 
price index, the change in the average unemployment 
rate, and the change in the market interest rate. All of 
these changes are computed between the quarter of 
mortgage origination and the earliest of the mortgage 
default rate or the end of the evaluation horizon (either 
12 or 24 months since origination). The model is esti-
mated on loan-level data, and standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level. The difference in conditional 
default rates between homebuilder- and non-home-
builder-originated loans is captured by an indicator 
variable for homebuilder mortgages. 
label
FIGURE 3
Share of loans first-time 90+ days delinquent by months since origination 
(2005 conventional, first-lien mortgages for single-family homes)
Sources: HMDA (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) data and LPS Applied Analytics.
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The set of regression results that incorporates 
these controls is shown in table 2, where the displayed 
coefficients represent marginal effects measured in 
percentage points. The first column contains the anal-
ysis of mortgage performance over the first 12 months 
since origination, while the second column shows the 
results for the 24-month horizon. Both regressions cover 
the entire sample period from 2001 through the end 
of 2008. We find that over both horizons, the estimated 
coefficient on builder-affiliated loans is negative, sug-
gesting lower default rates conditional on a large set 
of observable factors. These estimates are significant 
both statistically and economically. The 0.74 percentage 
point difference in conditional 12-month default rates 
is very precisely estimated, and it represents a substan-
tial improvement over the baseline default rate of 1.6 
percent. Similarly, the 1.24 percentage point difference 
in column 2 represents a sizable improvement over 
the baseline 24-month default rate of 4.5 percent. 
Among the macroeconomic control variables, the 
concurrent change in the metropolitan-area-level home 
prices has a very strong effect on defaults, with homes 
in areas with stronger past price growth (or smaller 
declines) defaulting much less frequently. Turning to 
the set of borrower and loan characteristics, we find a 
strong negative association between FICO score at 
mortgage origination and subsequent loan performance. 
We also find that higher default rates are associated with 
greater leverage on the first-lien loan at origination 
(loan-to-value ratios), lower borrower income, and 
higher loan amounts. We further document that non-
amortizing mortgages, mortgages that combined  
short periods of fixed interest rates with adjustable 
rates thereafter (the so-called 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid 
label
FIGURE 4
County-level delinquency rates, 2005 originations
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
Share 90+ day delinquency within 12 months
0 200 400 600
Miles
County
State
County-level LPS data, 2005
0.0000 to 0.0050
0.0050 to 0.0100
0.0100 to 0.0200
0.0200 to 0.0500
0.0500 to 0.1000
0.1000 to 1.0000
Other
45Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
adjustable-rate mortgages [ARMs]), and loans under-
written on the basis of incomplete documentation all 
defaulted at higher rates. The presence of these controls 
suggests that the estimated superior default performance 
of homebuilder loans derives from other factors. Before 
delving into a discussion of potential explanations, 
we test whether these results are present at different 
phases of the housing cycle.
Change in homebuilder lending practices 
and mortgage performance 
We next split the sample into two subperiods—
the buildup to the housing bubble, covering the years 
2001–04, and the peak years, followed by the housing 
price collapse (2005–08). If homebuilders were pre-
disposed to aggressive lending, such tendencies would 
arguably be most pronounced in the latter period. In 
2005–06, rapidly appreciating home prices may have 
   
  
TABLE 2 
Multivariate analysis of loan performance
 Default in the  Default in the
 first 12 months first 24 months
Year of origination       2001–08 2001–08
  
Builder-affiliate indicator – 0.74 –1.24 
 (–10.0)** (– 2.4)*
Change in market interest rate since origination 0.63 2.48
 (11.7)** (15.2)**
MSA home price growth since origination – 6.19 –12.43
 (– 4.2)** (– 7.5)**
Change in MSA unemployment rate since origination – 0.45 – 0.89
 (– 4.2)** (– 7.0)**
FICO score at origination – 0.02 – 0.04
 (– 36.9)** (– 45.1)**
Loan-to-value ratio at origination 0.04 0.11
 (28.2)** (19.3)**
Log income ($1,000s) – 0.52 –1.06
 (– 4.8)** (– 5.5)**
Not primary occupancy 0.37 0.16
 (1.6) (0.3)
Log loan amount 0.71 0.89
 (5.6)** (2.9)**
First observed interest rate 0.63 1.16
 (24.4)** (13.9)**
Non-amortizing mortgage 1.00 2.51
 (16.0)** (23.0)**
Amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage, non-hybrid – 0.17 – 0.70
 (–1.8) (– 2.8)**
Amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage, hybrid 0.86 2.14
 (11.3)** (8.8)**
Prepayment penalty – 0.08 0.36
 (– 0.6) (1.1)
Less-than-full documentation 0.32 0.67
 (12.4)** (7.8)**
Observations 3,917,801 3,917,801
Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.320
Failure rate (percentage points) 1.64 4.46
Notes: MSA is metropolitan statistical area. Logit analysis, 1 = 90 days or more past due within 12 (24) months. The sample includes purchase, 
conventional, first-lien mortgages for single-family homes. All regressions include state and year of origination fixed effects. The change in macro 
variables is from the quarter of origination to the earliest of the following dates: first default, the last time the loan is observed in the sample, or  
four (eight) quarters following origination. The displayed coefficients represent marginal effects in percentage points. Z-statistics based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses; **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively.   
Sources: LPS Applied Analytics and authors’ calculations. 
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led homebuilders to ramp up production and sales. In 
2007–08, homebuilders found themselves with large 
excess inventories of unsold homes and may have 
been tempted to sell them to even marginally credit-
worthy borrowers.
Columns 3–6 of table 1 (p. 41) summarize dramatic 
changes in borrower and loan characteristics over these 
two periods for homebuilder-affiliated and other lenders. 
Of particular note is the finding that the share of home-
builder borrowers with low FICO scores (below 620) 
falls from 11 percent in 2001–04 to just 4 percent in 
2005–08. A similar reduction (from 25 percent to  
13 percent) is observed for borrowers with FICO scores 
below 660. Although this result can be partially explained 
by the drying up of securitization activity beginning in 
the second half of 2007, we note the absence of a decline 
in the share of low-FICO-score borrowers among other 
types of lenders. Indeed, during the 2005–08 period, 
the share of affiliated lender loans going to low FICO 
borrowers was lower than the corresponding share for 
non-affiliated lenders. 
However, homebuilders appeared to ratchet up the 
risk profile of their lending activities along a number 
of other dimensions during 2005–08. Their lending 
became even more concentrated in the bubble states; 
they appeared to be willing to finance houses at greater 
multiples to income, and they relied increasingly on 
exotic mortgage products, such as hybrid ARMs and 
non-amortizing mortgages. At the same time, they also 
shifted toward underwriting practices that allowed for 
incomplete income and asset documentation. All of 
these trends are either absent or less pronounced among 
other lenders.
In terms of unconditional 24-month default rates, 
homebuilder loans performed strictly better in the first 
half of the sample for both prime and subprime bor-
rowers, as shown in columns 3 and 5 of table 1 (p. 41). 
However, in the later part of the sample, homebuilder 
loans have higher unconditional default rates. Although 
homebuilders cut back on their subprime exposure, their 
remaining subprime borrowers have higher default rates 
than subprime households borrowing from non-home-
builder lenders (27.4 percent versus 23.1 percent). Among 
prime borrowers, homebuilder loans showed even 
greater deterioration in relative default rates (6.6 percent 
versus 4.2 percent). The unconditional default rate 
during the late bubble period thus appears consistent 
with reckless homebuilder lending practices. Still,  
attributing higher defaults to underwriting practices 
requires, at a minimum, that we remove the potential 
influences of other default determinants.
To do that, we repeat the multivariate analysis 
described in the previous section for each of the two 
subperiods. The results, presented in table 3, are reveal-
ing. Even after conditioning on geographic and macro-
economic factors, as well as mortgage and borrower 
characteristics, homebuilder-affiliated mortgages 
originated during the early period (2001–04) exhibit 
lower default rates. This finding is true both for the 
short-horizon performance (column 1) and the longer-
horizon performance (column 2). This result also sug-
gests that the outperformance of homebuilder loans in 
the early period cannot be fully explained by the fact 
that homebuilders benefited from being particularly 
active in bubble states, where home prices increased 
the most.
If active participation in the boom areas was the 
only explanation for lower default rates of homebuilder 
loans during the formative years of the bubble, we 
would expect such loans to default more when home 
prices declined during the later period, as suggested 
by the comparison of unconditional default rates dis-
cussed above. In stark contrast, however, we find that 
conditional default rates on homebuilder loans are 
lower in the late bubble period (2005–08) over the short 
12-month horizon (column 3). Over the 24-month  
horizon, the conditional default rates on homebuilder 
loans are statistically indistinguishable from those on 
non-homebuilder loans.
Put differently, homebuilder loans originated during 
the peak bubble years and in the dire aftermath of the 
housing collapse perform as well or better than their 
non-homebuilder counterparts issued in similar geog-
raphies to similar borrowers. This result is robust to 
sample choice, the definition of default, the set of  
covariates, and the type of econometric model.11
Loan performance by contract type
The results in table 3 highlight an intriguing con-
trast between the strength of relative outperformance 
of homebuilder loans originated in 2005–08 over the 
12- and 24-month horizons. As noted earlier, during 
this period, homebuilders increasingly utilized mort-
gage contracts that did not require amortization in the 
early years of the loan. In our sample, such contracts 
accounted for 25 percent of homebuilder loans origi-
nated during 2005–08.12 The distinguishing character-
istic of non-amortizing contracts is that they allow the 
borrower to make a lower payment initially compared 
with, say, a conventional fixed-rate amortizing mortgage. 
The ability to lower early payments is particularly pro-
nounced in the case of the so-called negative amorti-
zation (or option ARM) contracts that allow payments 
to be less than the interest charges. Such lower payments, 
however, are only temporary, as all non-amortizing con-
tracts have to begin paying down principal at some point.
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   TABLE 3
Multivariate analysis of loan performance, different subperiods
 Default in the Default in the
 first 12 months first 24 months 
Year of origination       2001–04 2005–08 2001–04 2005–08
    
Builder-affiliate indicator – 0.48 – 0.71 –1.34 0.40 
 (–5.6)** (– 3.8)** (– 6.0)** (1.0)
Change in market interest rate since origination 0.05 1.33 – 0.14 4.67
 (2.0) (9.5)** (–1.4) (12.9)**
MSA home price growth since origination – 9.07 – 6.48 –12.64 –12.47
 (– 9.7)** (– 2.3)* (– 9.5)** (–5.3)**
Change in MSA unemployment rate since origination 0.03 – 0.80 0.15 –1.34
 (0.6) (– 4.4)** (0.9) (– 8.7)**
FICO score at origination – 0.01 – 0.03 – 0.02 – 0.07
 (– 46.0)** (–34.3)** (– 44.9)** (– 48.1)**
Loan-to-value ratio at origination 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.18
 (17.6)** (16.0)** (22.4)** (11.6)**
Log income ($1,000s) – 0.29 – 0.79 – 0.58 –1.79
 (–10.6)** (– 4.0)** (–10.6)** (–5.0)**
Not primary occupancy 0.04 0.54 – 0.59 0.95
 (0.9) (1.1) (– 4.7)** (1.0)
Log loan amount 0.20 1.24 0.15 1.78
 (2.9)** (5.1)** (1.0) (2.7)**
First observed interest rate 0.13 1.13 0.25 1.96
 (11.4)** (22.8)** (10.0)** (8.7)**
Non-amortizing mortgage 0.33 1.65 0.76 3.91
 (6.8)** (17.9)** (7.9)** (24.4)**
Amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage, non-hybrid – 0.13 – 0.03 – 0.38 0.20
 (– 4.2)** (– 0.1) (– 6.3)** (0.4)
Amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage, hybrid 0.15 1.47 0.43 3.44
 (4.8)** (8.2)** (9.0)** (5.9)**
Prepayment penalty – 0.01 – 0.11 0.13 0.85
 (– 0.2) (– 0.5) (1.4) (1.5)
Less-than-full documentation 0.15 0.38 0.13 1.01
 (5.3)** (8.3)** (1.9) (7.8)**
    
Observations 1,946,958 1,970,843 1,946,958 1,970,843
Pseudo R-squared 0.231 0.254 0.247 0.299
Failure rate 0.513 2.74 1.43 7.45
Notes: MSA is metropolitan statistical area. Logit analysis, 1 = 90 days or more past due within 12 months. The sample includes purchase, 
conventional, first-lien mortgages for single-family homes. All regressions include state and year of origination fixed effects. The change in macro 
variables is from the quarter of origination to the earliest of the following dates: first default, the last time the loan is observed in the sample, or four 
quarters following origination. The displayed coefficients represent marginal effects in percentage points. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the state level are in parentheses; **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively.   
Sources: LPS Applied Analytics and authors’ calculations.   
The question that arises, therefore, is whether 
homebuilder loans originated during the bubble for-
mation period did better in the short term because they 
were structured to make them easier to afford in the 
early years. In other words, can our results be ascribed 
to homebuilder-affiliated lenders’ practice of designing 
loans that kicked potential problems down the road?
To get some insight into this possibility, we re-
peat the analysis of the previous section on subsamples 
defined by specific contract types. Although we used 
contract-type indicator variables in our preceding anal-
ysis, such controls are imperfect. Consequently, we use 
more flexible specifications that look separately at all 
non-amortizing contracts (interest-only or negative amor-
tization) originated by homebuilder-affiliated and other 
lenders. We carry out a similar analysis on a subsample 
of conventional fixed-rate amortizing mortgages.
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   TABLE 4
Multivariate analysis of loan performance by contract type
 Default in the first 12 months Default in the first 24 months 
Year of origination       2001–08 2001–04 2005–08 2001–08 2001–04 2005–08
      
Panel A. Non-amortizing mortgages only
Builder-affiliate indicator –1.48 – 0.52 –1.86 0.69 –1.81 1.52 
 (– 9.8)** (–1.3) (–10.1)** (1.0) (– 2.6)** (1.8)
      
Macro, loan, and borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
      
Observations 600,315 209,605 390,358 600,315 209,656 390,358
Pseudo R–squared 0.234 0.296 0.200 0.282 0.288 0.245
Failure rate 3.18 0.865 4.43 8.92 2.33 12.5
Panel B. Fixed-rate amortizing mortgages only 
Builder-affiliate indicator – 0.50 – 0.25 – 0.29 – 0.80 – 0.51 0.27
 (– 5.0)** (– 3.4)** (– 2.6)** (– 2.5)* (– 2.9)** (0.7)
      
Macro, loan, and borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
      
Observations 2,807,941 1,409,667 1,398,274 2,807,941 1,409,667 1,398,274
Pseudo R-squared 0.260 0.228 0.251 0.290 0.233 0.287
Failure rate 0.96 0.404 1.52 2.88 1.19 4.59
Notes: Logit analysis, 1 = 90 days or more past due within 12 (24) months. The sample includes non-amortizing purchase, conventional, first-lien 
mortgages for single-family homes. All regressions include state and year of origination fixed effects, as well as the full set of covariates utilized in 
tables 2 and 3. The displayed coefficients represent marginal effects in percentage points. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered  
at the state level are in parentheses; **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively.   
Sources: LPS Applied Analytics and authors’ calculations.     
The results are shown in table 4. Since the focus 
is on homebuilder-affiliated lenders, we do not show 
the coefficients on all of the other controls, although 
they are included in all of the regressions. Indeed, we 
find a telling contrast between the 12- and 24-month 
default rates among non-amortizing mortgages (table 4, 
panel A). Whereas homebuilder loans experienced 
lower 12-month default rates on mortgages originated 
during the 2005–08 period (column 3), their relative 
default rates became higher over the longer 24-month 
horizon (column 6). Although the latter result is only 
marginally statistically significant, it is consistent with 
the possibility that better performance of homebuilder 
loans is more illusory than real.
Why could the homebuilders have been interested 
in originating loans that make it easier to avoid default 
in their early years? Part of the answer may lie in home-
builders’ reliance on securitization markets to fund 
their mortgages (Gartenberg, 2010). Under standard 
securitization agreements, an originator agrees to buy 
back from an investor any loan that defaults shortly 
(typically, within three or four months) after origination. 
Since homebuilder lenders had relatively little capital 
to accommodate such repurchase requests, they may 
have chosen to utilize non-amortizing mortgages as 
the means to manage this risk.
However, this does not imply that homebuilder 
default performance documented earlier in the article 
was driven exclusively (or even primarily) by such 
window-dressing practices. Panel B of table 4 shows 
that for fixed-rate amortizing mortgage contracts, which 
accounted for the lion’s share of lending, homebuilder 
loans performed much better over the 12-month horizon 
for the entire period and each of the subsamples  
(columns 1–3). Over the 24-month horizon, their per-
formance was better for the 2001–04 loan originations 
and effectively the same as that for non-homebuilder 
loans for the 2005–08 originations. These results are 
in line with our earlier analysis, while removing any 
potential contamination from improper controls for 
different mortgage contract composition. 
Discussion of results and directions  
for future work
We find that relative to other lenders, homebuilders 
financed mortgages in riskier geographies and served 
borrowers with observably riskier characteristics during 
the 2001 to 2008 period. However, we also show that 
these mortgages defaulted at significantly lower rates 
over the total sample period, once we control for the 
confounding influences of time, location, and risk 
characteristics. The finding of similar or better default 
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rates on homebuilder loans is particularly interesting 
for the 2005–08 origination period, when lending stan-
dards in mortgage markets were considered most lax 
and when the inventory of unsold houses was rising 
rapidly. While our study focuses on the performance 
of homebuilder loans and not on their building activity, 
the fact that these loans defaulted less than comparable 
loans by other lenders is inconsistent with explanations 
of the subprime mortgage crisis that envision a large 
role for homebuilders. 
In addition, our findings cannot be easily recon-
ciled with the existing literature on lending by affiliated 
firms. Like Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) and Barron, 
Chong, and Staten (2008), we find that homebuilder 
financing affiliates lend to riskier borrowers. However, 
unlike Barron, Chong, and Staten’s (2008) study of 
auto loans, we find that homebuilder affiliate loans 
have lower rather than higher default rates.
What is it about homebuilder financing affiliates 
that might account for this difference? As is the case 
for other captive lenders, the corporate parent profits 
from both the loan and the sale of the primary good. 
In addition, the incentives for riskier underwriting grow 
stronger when inventory levels are high, as signaling 
and agency issues offset the benefits of knowledge 
and coordination gained with integrating lending and 
sales (Pierce, 2012). 
Research on bank lending provides one possible 
explanation. For instance, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) 
show that banks with greater access to “soft” information 
are more willing to take on problematic borrowers. 
Homebuilders can arguably produce “soft” information 
more easily than other lenders as they interact with bor-
rowers frequently during the home buying process. These 
interactions have the potential to reveal borrower charac-
teristics—such as punctuality, willingness to provide 
information, or ability to meet pre-construction financial 
obligations—that are not captured by broadly available 
measures of risk such as FICO scores and income char-
acteristics. Having such information increases the 
ability of homebuilder lenders to avoid fraudulent 
transactions and make sound credit allocation decisions.
Stroebel (2013) offers a novel information-based 
channel to explain the superior performance of home-
builder-affiliated lenders. His paper emphasizes the 
informational advantages of affiliated lenders that 
manifest themselves not just through better ability to 
assess borrower creditworthiness, but also through 
better knowledge of the quality of housing construction. 
Better-built homes maintain higher collateral values 
and therefore represent a safer investment, holding 
borrower characteristics constant. Stroebel (2013) 
shows that houses financed by homebuilders indeed 
exhibited higher ex post appreciation rates and were 
less likely to experience major depreciation events, 
such as foundational cracks and leaky roofs. Moreover, 
this outperformance was greater among houses built 
on unstable (expansive) soil, where the quality of 
construction mattered most and where that quality 
could be best observed by the homebuilder. 
Other aspects of the home buying process and the 
organization of homebuilders may help to explain the 
superior performance of homebuilder loans. Gartenberg 
(2010) emphasizes the role of organizational form and 
sources of financing in disciplining homebuilders. She 
shows that homebuilders employed lower-powered 
incentives than financial lenders, in order to balance 
competing internal goals (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 
1991). Homebuilders also allocated limited capital to 
their lending units, forcing them to have little capacity 
to take back securitized loans, which further strengthened 
their incentives for careful underwriting (Gartenberg, 
2010). As our results suggest, these incentives may also 
have contributed to greater utilization of non-amortiz-
ing mortgage contracts by homebuilder lenders, which 
have a particularly strong impact on short-term loan 
performance. 
Two other aspects of buying new homes from a 
large corporate homebuilder merit discussion. The 
process of selecting a new home and its many features 
is often protracted and involves multiple interactions 
between the sales agent, prospective buyer, and even-
tually the loan underwriter. Although the credit decision 
is done separately from the sales process, homebuilder 
sales agents often engage in some form of financial 
education in their interactions with prospective buyers. 
They discuss topics such as typical maintenance ex-
penses (for example, those covered or not covered by 
the homeowners association), relative cost–benefit 
trade-offs of different building features, and ability to 
generate rental income, among others. All of these 
discussions arguably allow prospective borrowers to 
form more-accurate forecasts of expenses associated 
with homeownership. Other research has found that 
financial education programs geared toward budgeting 
for homeownership, both from the standpoint of 
amassing a down payment and contingency funds for 
home maintenance, have a sizable positive effect on 
subsequent mortgage performance (Agarwal et al., 2010). 
Finally, the often considerable time lag between signing 
the original sales contract and taking final possession 
of a completed house implies a number of differences 
between buyers who pre-commit to purchasing a new 
home and the general home buyer population. New 
home buyers (the only kind that homebuilder lenders 
serve) are willing to wait longer to get into their new 
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1See figure 1 (p. 39) for a time series of new and existing home pur-
chases and the fraction of new home purchases financed by home-
builders. During the housing boom years (2004–06), there was a 
gradual increase in the share of homebuilder-financed homes.
2Nine of the ten largest homebuilders have a financing affiliate. 
Among the ten largest homebuilders, the share of loans financed  
by an affiliate ranges from 57 percent for KB/Countrywide to  
91 percent for Pulte.
3Like many other lenders, builder-affiliated lenders securitize most 
of their loans, so incentives arising from the ability to securitize are 
likely to be similar for them as for unaffiliated lenders that also 
securitize.
4See, for example, www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-08-12/
bonfire-of-the-builders.
5Two important exceptions are Gartenberg (2010) and Stroebel 
(2013), which are discussed in more detail later in this article.
6See www.hopenow.com for additional details on activities of the 
Alliance.
7Our results are fully robust to including FHA and VA mortgages  
in the sample.
8We define a loan as being in default if it is 90 days or more past 
due, in foreclosure, or is real-estate owned in the first 12 (or 24) 
months after the first mortgage payment date. 
9A county-level correlation between the share of homebuilder- 
originated loans in 2005 (depicted in figure 2, p. 42) and 12-month 
default rates on loans originated in 2005 (depicted in figure 4,  
p. 44) is –0.02.
10We also estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) and Cox propor-
tional hazard models, which produce qualitatively similar results.
11Gartenberg (2010) obtains similar results in a sample of new- 
construction homes in the top 100 zip codes by building activity, 
using a Cox proportional hazard model of defaults. For the logit, 
OLS, and hazard models based on the data in this article, we  
evaluated both the 12- and 24-month default rates. These results 
are available on request.
12The majority (88 percent) of non-amortizing loans originated by 
homebuilder-affiliated lenders during this period were interest- 
only loans. The rest were negative amortization loans that allow 
mortgage balances to grow over time.
homes. They are also less likely to be liquidity-con-
strained, since they are able to tie up sizable purchase 
contract deposits for long periods. Again, these factors 
are likely to be positively associated with better mort-
gage performance.  
These explanations have different implications 
for what policy should or can do. Should policy goals 
be centered on changing incentives for lenders? Would 
greater investment in financial education improve credit 
decisions and outcomes? Or, is it perhaps true that 
buyers of new homes simply represent a different 
population of borrowers and their experience cannot 
be translated to other types of borrowers? Similarly, 
part of the superior performance of homebuilder loans 
originated during the boom-and-bust years appears to 
have come from the utilization of contract types that 
made early defaults less likely. In those years, capital 
markets did not generally condition early pay defaults 
on contract type; this may no longer be the case in the 
future given the experience of the recent mortgage 
crisis. Understanding how homebuilders were able to 
lend to riskier borrowers, use riskier loan terms, be very 
active in risky locations, and still underwrite mortgages 
with lower default rates than other lenders is an im-
portant research goal and may provide useful insights 
for housing policy.
NOTES
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